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Past research (Kruger, Wirtz, Van Boven, & Altermatt, 2004) proposed that people use the effort of the producer as a heuristic for the quality of
the product. In contrast, two experiments show that consumers' inferences from effort information are highly malleable. Participants were either
explicitly exposed to one of two applicable naive theories (“good-art-takes-effort” vs. “good-art-takes-talent”) or the order of judgment was
reversed (quality judgment first vs. talent judgment first) to activate different naive theories more subtly. In both cases, participants only inferred
high quality from high effort when an “effort” theory was rendered accessible, but not when a “talent” theory was rendered accessible. We
conclude that judgment tasks prime naive theories that can serve as inference rules, illustrating that heuristics can be constructed on the spot.
© 2008 Society for Consumer Psychology. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1 Kruger et al. (2004) acknowledged the possibility that high effort
information may occasionally lead to a low quality judgment by suggestingSuppose that you are attending a local art fair looking for a
painting for your home. You see a nice piece but can't tell
whether the price tag of $1000 is reasonable. Noticing your
interest, the artist approaches you and you learn that it took him
more than a year to complete the painting. Research by Kruger,
Wirtz, Van Boven, and Altermatt (2004) suggests that this effort
information may make you more inclined to purchase the
painting. Specifically, they observed that perceivers evaluated a
variety of objects more favorably, and were willing to pay a
higher price, the more effort the producer had invested.
Presumably, people assume that good work takes time and
effort, and hence infer high quality from high effort information.
But suppose a friend listened to your conversation and whispers
into your ear, “It took him more than a year? How talented do
you think he is?” If your reaction is like ours, you may start
wondering about the quality of the picture.
In general terms, we propose that we cannot predict
perceivers' inferences when we merely know which input
information they draw on, in this case, information about the
effort that went into the painting. To move from this information
to a judgment of quality, perceivers need to draw on background⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: hyejeung.cho@utsa.edu (H. Cho).
1057-7408/$ - see front matter © 2008 Society for Consumer Psychology. Publish
doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2008.04.009knowledge that links the input to the target judgment.We refer to
this knowledge as perceivers' naive theories about the respective
content domain. In the present case, one naive theory holds that
high quality products require careful work, which entails
considerable effort. Application of this theory results in a
positive influence of perceived high effort on quality judgments,
as captured by the effort heuristic of Kruger et al. (2004).
However, another plausible naive theory holds that skilled and
talented producers need to invest less effort than unskilled and
untalented producers for the same quality output. When
perceivers apply this theory as an inference rule, high effort
would raise some doubts about the producer's talent, which
renders the effort information nondiagnostic for judgments of
quality. In this case, the operation of the effort heuristic (Kruger
et al., 2004) should no longer be observed and perceivers may
even infer lower quality from higher effort.1 Experiment 1
provides a direct test of this hypothesis by explicitly manipulat-
ing the accessibility of the respective naive theory.that “the type of effort involved may be a key moderator …” (p.97). We agree.
More important, we propose that identical effort information may lead to
different judgments depending on which naive theory is applied as an inference
rule.
ed by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
206 H. Cho, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 18 (2008) 205–211More important from a theoretical perspective, we propose
that the judgment task itself influences which of several
applicable naive theories perceivers bring to mind (Schwarz,
2004a,b). Perceivers who are first asked to evaluate the quality
of a painting for which they have received effort information are
likely to draw on a naive theory that directly links effort and
quality; assuming that good work takes time, they will infer high
quality from high effort. In Kruger et al. (2004), participants
assessed the quality of poems (Experiment 1), paintings
(Experiment 2), and armors (Experiment 3) after receiving
either high or low effort information. In their experiments, the
higher perceived effort consistently led to higher perceived
quality, presumably because the quality judgment task itself
brought the ‘good-work-takes-time’ theory to mind.
However, perceivers who are first asked to judge the artist's
talent (before judging the quality) should be likely to draw on a
theory that directly links effort and talent; assuming that
talented producers are fast, they may hesitate later on to infer
high quality from high effort. Experiment 2 tests this judgment
order prediction. Support for this prediction would suggest that
people construct applicable heuristic inference rules on the spot,
rendering the application of heuristics highly malleable. We
return to this issue in the discussion.
In sum, we propose (i) that the same input information results
in different inferences, depending on the naive theory that
serves as an inference rule; (ii) that applicable naive theories are
recruited by the judgment task; and (iii) that application of one
theory can change the implications of the input information for
inferences that require the application of a different theory,
resulting in pronounced judgment order effects.
Experiment 1: Different naive theories explicitly primed
People hold a variety of beliefs about the association of
attributes that can serve as inference rules in making judgments
of personality (e.g., Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979) or
product quality (e.g., Kardes, Posavac, & Conley, 2004). These
beliefs often include causal assumptions (Nisbett & Ross,
1980), like the belief that high effort or high talent fosters high
quality of the produced output. Consistent with the terminolo-
gical tradition in person perception research, we refer to such
beliefs as naive theories. A pretest with 22 university students
indicated that the naive theories of interest to the present
experiments are widely shared by our participant population.
Specifically, 86.4% of the pretest participants agreed with the
statement, “Good work takes time,” and 100% of respondents
agreed with the statement, “High quality products usually
require more careful work than low quality products.” More
importantly, 90.9% also agreed that “Talented producers need to
invest less time than untalented producers to achieve the same
quality output,” and 86.4% of respondents agreed that
“Unskilled producers need to invest more time and effort in
the creation process than skilled producers for the same quality
output.” The high agreement with these statements indicates
that people hold multiple naive theories that may give rise to
different inferences about the relationship between production
effort, product quality, and the producer's talent.To render these different beliefs highly accessible, partici-
pants in Experiment 1 read a short paragraph that emphasized
either the role of effort or the role of talent in the production of
great art. Subsequently, they evaluated the quality of a picture as
part of an allegedly separate study. We predicted that the
previously observed high effort–high quality relationship
(Kruger et al., 2004) would replicate when a “good-art-takes-
effort” theory is rendered accessible, but not when a “good-art-
takes-talent” theory is rendered accessible.
Method
Participants and design
172 undergraduate students were randomly assigned to the
conditions of a 2 (effort information: high vs. low effort)×2
(presented theory: effort theory vs. talent theory) factorial
design with a non-factorial control group.
Materials and procedure
Participants were asked to participate in multiple unrelated
studies that were grouped together for efficiency. For
participants assigned to the experimental conditions, the alleged
first study served the manipulation of theory accessibility and
followed procedures used by Chiu, Dweck, Tong, and Fu
(1997) and McConnell (2001). Participants were told that the
study examined the influence of time delay on memory and
were asked to read a short article, for which they would later
receive a comprehension and memory test. The article reported
on a presentation by an art historian who emphasized either the
role of effort or the role of talent in the production of great art.
The key paragraphs are shown in the Appendix.
Next, participants completed a short filler task, presented as a
second study, asking them to compare and evaluate four
different electronic products, before they turned to an alleged
third study, entitled ‘Auction Study’. This third study was
introduced as a study of consumer judgment and participants
were asked to evaluate a contemporary painting, allegedly
chosen at random from a larger pool of paintings at an art
auction. Along with a picture of the painting, they received
basic information about the art work, including the painting's
title (May's End), the artist's name (William Morehouse), the
year (2004), the media used (Oil on Canvas), and the original
size of the painting (36×32 in). Additional information,
allegedly provided by the painter, informed them how long
the painter had worked on the painting. Some participants were
told that it had taken the artist more than 1 year to finish the art
work (high effort condition), whereas others learned that it had
taken him two to three days (low effort condition). Participants'
task was to estimate for how much money the painting would
sell at an auction; they provided their estimate along a 10-point
scale (1= less than $100; 10=more than $3500).
Following the estimate, the alleged second part of the initial
comprehension and memory study was introduced to collect
various manipulation checks. Specifically, participants sum-
marized the main message they had read in their own words,
thus providing a measure of how carefully they had read the






































Fig. 1. Mean of the ‘perceived monetary value of the painting' as a function of
‘presented theory' and ‘effort information’ (Experiment 1).
207H. Cho, N. Schwarz / Journal of Consumer Psychology 18 (2008) 205–211addition, they rated the article read in terms of its comprehen-
sion difficulty, credibility, and persuasiveness (on scales of 1 to
7, with 7 indicating high difficulty, credibility, and persuasive-
ness, respectively).
Participants assigned to the non-factorial control condition
were not exposed to the theory manipulation (alleged first
study) and estimated the auction price of the painting without
learning about the painter's effort. Their estimates provide a
baseline based on exposure to the painting, its title, and the
name of the artist.
As a last step, participants were probed for suspicion and
wrote down what they thought the research hypotheses were. At
the end, all participants received debriefing information
including the true information about the painting (“May's
End” by William Morehouse (1929–1993), Oil on Canvas,




Thememorymeasure indicated that 16 of the 172 participants
did not recall the main point of the article they had read. 10
participants reported suspicion and guessed that the “compre-
hension and memory” study and the “auction” study were
related. Finally, five reported that they were already familiar with
the painting. All of these participants were excluded from further
analyses, leaving 141 participants in the study.2
The two articles that served as theory manipulations did not
differ in terms of their perceived comprehensibility, credibility
and persuasiveness, all t'sb1.5, ns.
Value of the painting
We first conducted a 2 (effort)×2 (theory) analysis of
variance (ANOVA) on the factorial portion of the data. As
shown in Fig. 1, participants who were exposed to the effort
theory predicted that the painting would sell at a higher price
when it took the artist more than a year to produce it
(M=6.37; SD=2.76) rather than only 2–3 days (M=3.82;
SD=1.61); F(1, 113)=17.47, pb .001, for the simple main effect.
In contrast, the artist's effort did not exert a significant influence
when participants were exposed to the talent theory (M's=4.78
and 5.27; SD's=2.39 and 2.60, for low and high effort,
respectively); Fb1, for the simple main effect. This pattern of
results is reflected in the predicted interaction of effort and
presented theory, F(1, 113)=12.13, pb .005.
A non-factorial control group estimated the picture's auction
price (M=3.96; SD=1.99) without being exposed to an
applicable naive theory or information about the painter's
effort. Comparisons with this control group indicate that only
the two experimental conditions in which the primed theory
matched the effort information differ from baseline. Specifi-
cally, participants primed with the effort theory provided a price2 Including all participants in the analyses did not change the pattern of
results.estimate above baseline when the painter's effort was high
(F(1, 136)=14.03, pb .001, for the contrast), but not when it
was low (Fb1, for the contrast). Conversely, participants primed
with the talent theory provided a price estimate above baseline
when the painter's effort was low (F(1, 136)=4.33, pb .05, for
the contrast), but not when it was high (Fb2, ns, for the contrast).
Discussion
In sum, participants' inferences from effort information
depended on which of two applicable naive theories was
rendered accessible by an earlier manipulation. After reading
that producing good art requires a lot of effort, participants
predicted that the same picture would sell at a higher price when
they learned that the artist had worked on it for more than a year
rather than for 2–3 days. Moreover, their price estimates only
exceeded the estimates of a control group that had not been
exposed to a relevant theory or to effort information when the
artist's effort was high, thus satisfying the key quality predictor
specified by the primed theory. Conversely, after reading that
producing good art requires a lot of talent, participants' price
estimates only exceeded the baseline condition when the artist's
effort was low. Given participants' assumption that talented
producers need to invest less effort (as indicated by our pretest
data), low effort presumably highlighted the artist's talent,
whereas high effort called it into question. Accordingly, these
participants also evaluated the picture nonsignificantly more
favorably under low than high effort conditions.
In combination, these results confirm the reasonably obvious
prediction that the application of different inference rules to the
same input data results in different judgments. One plausible,
and theoretically not very exciting, conclusion is that Kruger
et al. (2004) observed a robust influence of effort on quality
judgments because the relevant naive theory is chronically
accessible. Replacing this theory with an alternative one
requires a heavy-handed manipulation of the type used here.
Table 1
Means and standard deviations of ‘perceived quality of the painting’ and
‘perceived talent of the artist,’ and medians and standard deviations of
‘perceived monetary value of the painting’ (Experiment 2)
Quality-first condition Talent-first condition
High effort Low effort High effort Low effort
Perceived quality 6.85 (2.03) 5.00 (1.50) 5.29 (1.88) 5.75 (1.66)
Median perceived
value
$1250 ($2788) $500 ($3341) $425 ($2233) $800 ($3077)
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malleable than standard theorizing about the application of
heuristic inference rules assumes. We now turn to this
possibility, which motivated the present research.
Experiment 2: Naive theories activated by judgment tasks
Whereas Experiment 1 explicitly exposed participants to
one of two applicable naive theories, Experiment 2 tests
whether the judgment task itself is sufficient to bring the
respective theory to mind. When asked to judge the quality of
a painting, participants need to draw on a plausible inference
rule that allows them to form a quality judgment on the basis
of the available information. If they have effort information at
hand, they may use a good-work-takes-time theory, resulting in
an inference of high quality from high effort, as observed in
Experiment 1 and initially reported by Kruger et al. (2004).
Once they inferred high quality, they may also conclude that
the artist has high talent — after all, he produced a high quality
piece of art. But when first asked how talented the artist is, the
judgment task may bring the alternative talented-people-are-
fast theory to mind, thus calling the effort-quality association
into question. In this case, the artist's effort may either be
discounted as uninformative or may give rise to the opposite
conclusions.
To test these possibilities, we conducted a modified repli-
cation of Experiment 1, asking participants to judge the
painting's quality and likely auction price as well as the
painter's talent. We predicted that high effort would result in
high quality, value, and talent judgments when quality is
evaluated first, but not otherwise.
Method
Participants and design
One hundred undergraduate students were randomly
assigned to the conditions of a 2 (effort information: high vs.
low effort)×2 (judgment task: quality vs. talent judgment first)
factorial design. Three participants guessed the purpose of the
study, one was familiar with the painting and the painter used in
the experiment, and the open-ended price estimates of three
participants were extreme outliers; these seven participants were
excluded from data analyses, reducing the total N to 93.3
Materials and procedure
Participants received a questionnaire entitled “Artistic
Judgment Study” which described the experiment as a study
of artistic impressions. Participants were shown the same
painting used in Experiment 1 (May's End) and also received
similar basic information on the painting and the artist's
creation process. In the high effort condition, participants
learned that it had taken the artist more than 1 year to finish the
art work and that he had drawn more than 15 sketches before
completing the painting; in the low effort condition, they3 Including these participants did not change the pattern of results.learned that it had taken him 2–3 days to finish the painting and
that he had drawn no idea sketch.
Participants assigned to the quality-first condition first rated
the overall quality of the painting (1=not so good; 11=very
good), estimated the amount of money they thought it would
sell for at an art auction (as an open-ended response in USD),
and finally indicated how talented they thought the painter was
(1=not so talented; 11=very talented). Participants assigned to
the talent-first condition made the same judgments in reverse
order (i.e., talent, auction price, and quality). Finally, all
participants indicated whether they had seen the painting or the
artist's other paintings before, were probed for suspicion, and
fully debriefed.
Results
Quality of the painting
Our theoretical rationale predicts that high production effort
results in inferences of high product quality only when
perceivers do not consider the producer's talent first. As
shown in Table 1, the data support this prediction. In the quality-
first condition, participants evaluated the same painting more
favorably when they assumed that the artist invested a high
rather than a low degree of effort; F(1, 89)=11.95, pb .01, for
the simple main effect. This replicates the results of Kruger et al.
(2004). However, when participants first thought about the
talent of the artist, the influence of effort on judgments of
quality was eliminated; Fb1 for the simple main effect. This
pattern of results is reflected in the predicted interaction of effort
and question order, F(1, 89)=9.84, pb .01. No other effects
were significant.
Value of the painting
Following their initial judgment (of either quality or talent),
participants estimated for how much money the painting would
sell at an art auction. Unlike Experiment 1, where ranges of US
dollar values were pre-assigned to a ten-point scale, partici-
pants provided their price estimates as an open-ended response
in USD. As shown in Table 1, their value estimates mirror the
pattern of the quality judgments and are consistent with the
value estimates obtained in Experiment 1. However, due to
very high variance in the open-ended dollar responses (which
ranged from $18 to $15,000; SD=$2874), the interaction
of effort and judgment order failed to reach significance,
F(1, 89)=2.49, ns.Perceived talent 7.30 (1.84) 5.58 (1.82) 5.21 (1.77) 5.80 (1.85)
Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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Finally, participants' talent judgments also revealed the
predicted interaction of effort and judgment order, F(1, 89)=
9.31, pb .01. Not surprisingly, participants who had just provided
a positive evaluation of the painting also inferred that the painter is
talented, resulting in a positive influence of effort on their talent
judgments in the quality-first condition, F(1, 89)=9.73, pb .01,
for the simplemain effect. In contrast, when participants made the
talent judgment first, they tended to perceive the artist as being
somewhat less talented in the high than in the low effort condition,
although this pattern did not reach significance (Fb1.5, for the
simple main effect).
This pattern also resulted in a significant main effect of
judgment order, F(1, 89)=6.14, pb .05, that is qualified by the
above interaction. Overall, participants judged the artist to be
more talented when the quality rather than talent judgment came
first (M's=6.36 and 5.51, respectively). No other effects were
significant.
Discussion
In sum, participants' inferences from effort information were
strongly influenced by judgment order. Most importantly,
participants inferred high quality from high effort when the
quality judgment was assessed first, but not when it followed a
talent judgment. Presumably, the talent judgment brought an
alternative naive theory to mind (“talented producers are fast”)
that undermined the informational value of the effort informa-
tion. This interpretation is supported by the results of
Experiment 1, in which a more direct manipulation of
applicable naive theories had parallel effects on price estimates
as an indicator of quality.
General discussion
As the German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz
(1646–1716) noted, any given piece of data is compatible with
numerous different theories (Magee, 1985). This applies to real
life as to science, and people's inferences from a given piece of
information depend on the naive theory that they apply as an
inference rule. Investigating the role of effort information in
quality judgments, Kruger and colleagues (2004) identified one
such theory. People assume that good work takes time and
effort, and hence infer quality from effort. However, this effort
heuristic is not the only naive theory applicable to effort
information. People also assume, for example, that talented
producers are fast and need to invest less effort than untalented
producers to arrive at a product of comparable quality. As our
pretest indicated, both theories were endorsed by an over-
whelming majority of participants, their somewhat conflicting
implications notwithstanding. When people apply these naive
theories to the same effort information, they should arrive at
different inferences. Not surprisingly, they do.
In Experiment 1, we explicitly exposed participants to
material that suggested either that producing good art takes
effort or that it takes talent. As predicted, effort information only
exerted a significant influence on participants' assessments ofthe painting when an applicable effort theory was primed.
Having set the stage with a somewhat heavy-handed manipula-
tion in Experiment 1, we tested in Experiment 2 whether the
judgment task itself is sufficient to recruit an applicable theory.
As expected, effort information exerted a significant influence
on participants' evaluation of the painting when the first
judgment pertained to the painting's quality, replicating the
results of Kruger et al. (2004). However, no significant
influence of effort information was observed when the first
judgment pertained to the artist's talent, thus bringing a
competing theory to mind.
In fact, effort information tended to have a reverse impact on
participants' assessments of the painting when a talent theory
was rendered accessible. Most notably, talent-primed partici-
pants who learned that the artist spent only 2–3 days on the
painting estimated that it would sell at a higher price than
participants assigned to a no-prime control group that received
no effort information (Experiment 1); yet learning that it took
the artist more than a year to complete the painting did not lower
its perceived value relative to control conditions. This
asymmetric impact is consistent with the implications of a
talent theory: Being able to produce a nice painting in a short
time implies high talent, but taking one's time does not
necessarily imply low talent. In addition, the pattern of
participants' judgments consistently showed a more favorable
evaluation of the painting under low effort conditions whenever
a talent theory was rendered accessible (Experiments 1 and 2),
although these effects did not reach significance. The overall
weaker impact of effort information under talent than under
effort theory conditions is consistent with the differential
diagnostic value of effort information in the context of these
naive theories.
Implications
These findings have theoretical, methodological, and
applied implications. On the theoretical side, they highlight
that merely knowing which input information people draw on
does not allow us to predict their judgments. Instead, we need
to understand the inference rules that they are likely to apply.
These inference rules can be thought of as naive theories that
link the input variable to the to-be-judged attribute of the
target. As demonstrated by the order effects observed in
Experiment 2, applicable theories are recruited by the respective
judgment task (Schwarz, 2004a). More important, application
of a given theory entails a causal attribution, e.g., “He was so
fast because it is low quality work” vs. “He was so fast because
he is really talented.” These attributions will usually render the
initial input information uninformative for judgments that
require the application of a different naive theory — once low
quality is inferred, high talent no longer follows and vice
versa. Occasionally, however, the attribution underlying the
initial judgment will also have implications for subsequent
judgments, resulting in carry-over effects. For example, the
conclusion that the product is of high quality implies that
the producer is talented because untalented people rarely
produce high quality work. As a result, order effects can be
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domains, including the inferences that people draw from their
own feelings and meta-cognitive experiences (e.g., Xu &
Schwarz, 2005; see Pham, 2004; Schwarz, 2004a; Schwarz &
Clore, 2007, for a discussion). Such findings highlight that
applicable heuristics are often constructed on the spot to allow
the person to get from “here” (the available data) to “there”
(the requested judgment). Future research may fruitfully
explore to which extent the recruitment of different inference
rules is influenced by variables known to affect other aspects
of mental construal, like processing motivation and style (e.g.,
Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006; Wyer, Hung, & Jiang, in
press), affective state at the time of judgment (e.g., Han,
Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Schwarz & Clore, 2007), psycholo-
gical distance (Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007), and
environmental primes (Dijksterhuis, Smith, van Baaren, &
Wigboldus, 2005).
In addition, the observed malleability of participants'
inference strategies highlights several methodological chal-
lenges for judgment research. First, the observation that
judgment tasks recruit applicable naive theories as inference
rules implies that there is no “neutral” condition that reliably
captures what people would spontaneously think in a natural
context. As soon as a question is posed as the dependent
variable, it may bring theories to mind that the person may
otherwise not think of. As the parallel effects of explicit
priming (Experiment 1) and judgment order (Experiment 2)
illustrate, the dependent variable itself serves as a prime,
turning the act of measurement into an experimental treatment.
Second, the observed malleability further implies that many
judgment effects are probably less robust than the experimental
literature suggests. As long as the tasks presented by the
experimenter recruit the same naive theories, and do so in the
same order, observed results are likely to replicate across
different stimuli (e.g., Kruger et al., 2004). However, as seen in
the present research, a mere change in judgment order can
recruit a different inference rule, resulting in qualitatively
different judgments. This may be at the heart of many failures
to replicate prior results, which would have been robust had
the same question order been observed. Unfortunately, this
malleability also highlights the difficulties involved in general-
izing from experimental results to natural contexts. Short of
knowing which questions people ask themselves sponta-
neously it is difficult to predict which of many applicable
naive theories they will draw on — and presenting the
dependent variable may override whatever may have come to
mind spontaneously.
Finally, on the applied side, our findings illustrate that
informing consumers that it took a lot of effort to produce an
object does not necessarily boost consumers' perceptions of
high quality. Knowing that it took a tailor 6 months to finish
your suit (rather than the common 4–6 weeks) does not
necessarily guarantee that you will want to pay more for the
garment — in fact, it may only raise doubts about his skill and
talent. Future research may fruitfully explore which aspects of a
consumption situation, and which goals, give rise to which
naive theory in the wild.Appendix A
The following paragraphs served as manipulations in
Experiment 1.
Dr. Myles, in his concluding remarks, highlights the great
artists' effort put in their artwork.
“When you stand in a museum, say the Prado or the Louvre,
and contemplate the art before you, be it a sculpture or a
painting, what impresses you first would be the artist's
creativity or skill shown in the artwork. You might think that
great artists are simply born with great talent, making it easy for
them to create a masterful work of art. However, the fact is that
the great artists were not just born to create. You will be
surprised to know the enormous amount of time and effort that
went into the creating of their artistic masterpieces. Confirming
the truism that “Good work takes time,”many historical records
and studies provide evidence that the most important thing that
all great artists had in common was their persistent effort and
enduring hard work. They were always determined to overcome
difficulties and setbacks in the long creation process. Without
their effort and determination, most influential masterpieces
would have never been born. Great art is not just the finished
work but also the sweat and effort that made it possible.”
Dr. Myles, in his concluding remarks, highlights the great
artists' artistic instinct and talent.
“When you stand in a museum, say the Prado or the Louvre,
and contemplate the art before you, be it a sculpture or a
painting, what impresses you would be the creativity and the
talent shown in the artwork. You may be even more surprised
and impressed once you realize that many masterpieces were
created in a short period of intense creativity. Confirming our
naive theory of creativity and talent, many historical records and
studies provide evidence that the great artists in the world's
history were really born with the creativity and they were truly
gifted in one way or another. Without their talent, they would
have never been able to create such influential masterpieces
only in a matter of days or sometimes even hours. The great art
does seem to be born by the artist's inspiration. These artists
knew how to let their artistic talent lead them throughout their
creation process. Great art is not just the finished work but also
the inspiration and the creative talent that made it possible.”References
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